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If the Shoe
Fits ...
by Donald J. Katz
In the case of Shaffer v. Heitner, 97
S.Ct. 2569 (1977), the Supreme Court
has determined that state court jurisdiction is no longer based on the standards of
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714. The Court
now holds that the jurisdictional standard
of "minimum contacts" applied to personal actions in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, also governs
in rem and quasi-in-rem actions.
Heitner, a non-resident of Delaware,
owned one share of stock in Greyhound
Corporation, a Delaware corporation. He
filed a shareholder's derivative suit in
Delaware state court, alleging that
Greyhound, a subsidiary in California,
and twenty-eight present or former officers or directors of the two corporations
had violated their corporate duties. He
claimed the defendants had involved the
corporations in activities in Oregon which
caused a private anti-trust suit that
resulted in substantial damages as well as
fines from a criminal contempt action.
Simultaneously, Heitner filed fI moti<m
for an order of sequestration of property
under 10 Del. C. § 366. He also filed supporting affidavits that the defendants were
non-residents and identifying the pr'operty
to be sequestered as stock, stock options,
warrants of purchase and other corporate
rights of the defendants. An order of sequestration was signed later the same day
and the court appointed a sequestrator to
"seize" and stop transfers of the defendants' stock shares and options.
In Delaware, the stock of all corporations existing under the state's law has a
situs there. For purposes of the sequestration statute, the stock certificates were
considered to be statutorily present in
Delaware and subject to seizure even
though they weren't physically present in
the state.
Property was seized from twenty-one of
the defendants. A special appearance was
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entered in an attempt to quash service of
process and to vacate the sequestration
order. The defendants contended they
were denied procedural due process, an
issue the Supreme Court chose not to
reach. They also contended their property
seized was not capable of attachment and
their contacts with the state of Delaware
were insufficient under International
Shoe, to sustain state court jurisdiction.
The Delaware Chancery Court rejected
these arguments. Finding no state law or
federal constitutional barriers to the
statute in its procedural application, the
Chancery Court held that the statutory
situs of the stock was sufficient to support
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that application
of the International Shoe test was not at
issue. The Court reasoned that jurisdiction was quasi-in-rem based on the presence of the stock in Delaware through its
statutory situs of ownership. Since the
presence of the stock wasn't based on
prior contacts with the forum, the seizure
was not held invalid for failure to meet the
minimum contacts test of International
Shoe.
The United States Supreme Court
reversed. The Court said that Delaware's
rejection of the jurisdictional challenge
assumed the continued validity of Pennoyer v. Neff, that quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is based on property present in or attached to the state, but doesn't require contacts between the defendants and the
state.
Departing from the past, the Court
decided that the jurisdictional scheme

outlined in Penn oyer is circular in reasoning and that the idea of jurisdiction over
property really means jurisdiction over
the interests of persons in property. Thus,
the basis for an exercise of in rem jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of
persons in property.
The minimum contacts standard, as set
out in International Shoe, will now determine whether an exercise of in rem or
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is consistent
with due process.
According to the Court, while cases
having their source of controversy in
claims to the property itself will generally
support state court jurisdiction, the presence of a defendant's property in a state is
merely evidence that jurisdiction exists.
Applying the facts of Shaffer, the
Supreme Court determined that the presence of corporate holdings that were
neither the subject matter of the litigation
nor related to the underlying cause of action were insufficient contacts for jurisdiction of Heitner's action in Delaware.
The presence of property in a state
might suggest other ties between the defendant, the state, and the litigation, but if
the property serving as the basis for an exercise of state court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of
action, the presence of property alone
won't support jurisdiction. If other contacts or ties don't exist, the case can't be
brought in that forum.
However, a debtor won't be able to
avoid legal obligations by removing property to a state where his creditor can't obtain jurisdiction, the Court notes. The Full
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Faith and Credit Clause makes enforceable the judgment of one state in all
others. Once a court of competent jurisdiction in one state has determined that a
defendant is the debtor of a plaintiff, it
will allow an action on the debt in other
states where the defendant has property,
even if the latter wouldn't originally have
had jurisdiction to determine the debt.
A number of reasons why contacts with
a state can support a finding of jurisdiction are given by the Court. A defendant's
claim to property located in a state would
normally indicate an expected benefit
from the state's protection of that property. A state has an interest in assuring the
marketability of property within its borders as well as in providing a procedure
for peaceful resolution of disputes about
posseSSion of the property. Also, there is
the likelihood that important records and
witnesses will be found in the state where
the property is located. The Court notes,
however, that while these and other factors may affect a decision as to jurisdiction, none is necessarily decisive.

It's Alright

Ma (Bell)
by Andrew S. Katz

With a proper order from a United
States District Court, federal law enforcement officials may now compel your local
telephone company to provide facilities
and technical assistance in support of
electronic surveilance operations authorized by warrant. In the decision of United
States v. New York Telephone Company,
46 U.S.L.W. 4033 (Dec. 6, 1977), the
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United States Supreme Court upheld an
order of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York authorizing agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to install pen registers (a
device that records the numbers dialed on
a telephone) and directing the New York
Telephone Company to provide the FBI
with the information and facilities necessary to employ the pen registers covertly
during the investigation of an illegal gambling operation.
The District Court issued the order on
the basis of an FBI affidavit stating that
there was probable cause to believe that
two telephones in Manhattan were being
used in furtherance of illegal gambling activity. The Company refused fully to comply with the court order, locating the lines
that were of interest but refusing to lease
to the FBI unused lines needed to operate
their equipment without notice. Although
the FBI was authorized to compensate the
Company for its assistance, the agents
were advised to string their own cables to
the suspects' apartment, a task impossible
to accomplish without alerting the
suspects. The Company moved in the District Court to vacate that part of the order
directing it to furnish facilities and technical assistance to the FBI on the ground
that the order could only be issued in connection with a wiretap order meeting the
requirements of Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. It
denyed that the District Court possessed
authority to give the order under either
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 or the All Writs
Act, 28 U.s.c. § 1651(a). The District
Court held that pen registers are not
governed by Title III because they do not
intercept oral communication, they only
record phone numbers. It claimed jurisdiction to issue the order upon a showing of
probable cause relying upon the authority
of the All Writs Act and its "inherent
powers" to direct the Company to assist
the FBI.
In Application of the United States of
America in the Matter of an Order
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register or
Similar Mechanical Device, 538 F.2d 956
(2d. Cir. 1976), the Court of Appeals
agreed with the District Court on the

scope of Title III and the power to authorize pen register surveilance under Fed.
Rule Crim. Proc. 41. However, the majority also held that "in the absence of
specific and properly limited Congressional action, it was an abuse of discretion
for the District Court to order the
Telephone Company to furnish technical
assistance." 538 F. 2d at 961. The Court
of Appeals warned that "such an order
could establish a most undersirable, if not
dangerous and unwise, precedent for the
authority of the federal courts to impress
unwilling aid on private third parties" and
that "there is no assurance that the court
will always be able to protect (third parties) from excessive or overzealous
Government activity or compUlsion." 538
F. 2d at 962-963. The District Court's
order against the Company was invalidated and a petition for certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court.
Justice White's majority opinion
(joined in by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices BIackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist) reviews the language and legislative
history of Title III and concludes that pen
registers are not within the scope of its requirements. Title III is concerned with the
interception of wire or oral communication, "intercept meaning 'the aural aquisition of the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device.'
18 U.s.c. § 2510(4). Pen registers do not
acquire the 'contents' of communications .... " 46 U.S.L.W. at 4035.
Therefore, reasons the majority, the District Court had authority to direct the
Company to provide assistance to the FBI
although the pen register order was not in
conformity with Title III.
By holding that the District Court had
power to authorize the installation of the
pen registers, the majority expands the
meaning of search and seizure under Fed.
Rule Crim. Proc. 41 to include a "search"
to discover the use a telephone is being
put to when there is a suspicion of its involvement in a criminal venture. Rule 41
authorizes warrants for seizures of property or contraband and "property" is
defined to include documents, books,
papers and any other tangible objects.
The opinion states that "it does not

